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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Bradley Goodrich was sentenced April 25, 2016. He contends that the District Court abused 
its discretion when it imposed and executed his sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction over the 
case, as per previous discussions with the prosecuting attorney. Specifically, he asserts the District 
Court failed to sufficiently consider the sentencing goals of rehabilitation and protection of society 
as well as other sentencing goals, in doing so, as the mitigating factors in this case reveal those goals 
would be better served by retaining jurisdiction. In fact, all factors should have been given more 
consideration in the Defendant's favor. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the sentencing order 
and remand this case with instructions to retain jurisdiction. 
STATEMENTS OF THE FACTS & COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Goodrich grew up in a home dominated by an abusive alcoholic stepfather. This 
childhood left him scarred and facing a life that no child should have to deal with. When Mr. 
Goodrich was thirteen, he witnessed his mother shoot and kill his adoptive father in a case of 
mistaken identity. (See Presentence Investigation Report (hcreinc{fter, PST), pp.192-93, 207.) His 
mother was subsequently convicted of second degree murder and served time in prison, during which 
time Mr. Goodrich moved to California to try and suppo11 himself. (PSI, p.193.) Unfo1tunately, Mr. 
Goodrich developed a lifestyle, which included abusing alcohol and drugs, such as marijuana. (Tr., 
p.26, L.9 - p.27, L.12.) Nevertheless, Mr. Goodrich was able to persevere and lived a mostly law-
abiding life, except for a brief period of time when he was going through a divorce. (See Tr., p.43, 
L.6 - p.44, L.6.) 1 
1 While the transcripts in this case were provided in two separately bound and paginated volumes, 
unless otherwise indicated, references to "Tr." refer to the volume containing the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing held on April 25, 2016. 
1 ' 
The bulk of the time he worked to support himself. The last 17 years for Albertson's where he 
became a dependable produce manager. 
Things began to change in 2013, when Mr. Goodrich suffered a back injury while on the job, 
which left him unable to work. (See PSI, p.197.) He was prescribed hydrocodone until 2015, and 
he became addicted to that medication. (Tr., p.30, Ls.9-10.) His situation continued to devolve, 
which ended with him using methamphetamine with a sixteen-year-old girl, with whom he had 
fostered a romantic, then a sexual, relationship. (See, e.g., R., pp.64-67.) Ultimately, Mr. Goodrich 
was charged with several counts of sexual battery of a minor and several other charges related to his 
own possession of methamphetamine, as well as providing methamphetamine to the victim. (See 
R., pp.64-67.) There was a legitimate question as to whether he was aware of her true age. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Goodrich pleaded guilty to one count of sexual battery of 
a minor and one count of possession of a controlled substance. (Change of Plea Tr., p.8, Ls.9-14.) 
In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, as well as charges in another case 
(though it retained the ability to argue the facts of the dismissed charges at sentencing), and 
recommend a sentence with two years fixed. (Change of Plea Tr., p.8, Ls.12-22.) 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel recommended an aggregate underlying sentence 
of ten years, with two years fixed, with a period of retained jurisdiction so that the Court could assess 
Mr. Goodrich's potential for rehabilitation. Counsel made a strong case for this rehabilitation 
potential. (Tr., p.40, Ls.13-25.) Defense counsel noted Mr. Goodrich's moderate and increasing 
desire for, and amenability to, change. (Tr., p.33, L.14 - p.36, L.24.) The District Court 
acknowledged several of the mitigating factors, even agreeing with Mr. Goodrich's concern that the 
victim's report carried an element of exaggeration. (Tr., p.45, Ls.15-22.) However, it decided not 
to retain jurisdiction, but rather, to impose and execute a unified sentence of twenty years, with five 
2 
years fixed, on the possession charge. (Tr., p.48, Ls.9-18.) It explained that it did not want to 
discount the possibility that Mr. Goodrich could become a law-abiding citizen again at some point 
in the future, but clarified, "the primary focus of this sentence was punishment for the bad behavior 
that occurred here." (Tr., p.51, Ls.3-14.) 
One factor that was not considered, was a severe medical condition that Mr. Goodrich had. 
This should have not only affected the validity of his guilty plea, but the nature of the sentence. Prior 
to sentencing he had fallen in the courtroom and struck his head. This left him woozy and confused 
at the time ofhis sentencing. He began to experience additional problems later and found that he had 
a large growth, as big as a golf ball, inside his eye socket. This was later surgically removed. It is 
believed that this was caused by the fall. Mr. Goodrich also has heart and other health problems. This 
should be a consideration in sentencing. 
Mr. Goodrich filed a Notice of Appeal time from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.183, 
188.) 
3 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
(A) Did the sentencing judge abuse his authority by giving the sentence that he did, i.e. twenty 
years with five fixed on the sexual battery charge and five years with one fixed for the drug 
charge, concurrent with each other? 
(B) Did the Defendant's medical condition interfere with his ability to knowingly enter a 
guilty plea to these charges? 
4 l 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN TT IMPOSED AND 
EXECUTED MR. GOODRICH'S SENTENCE AND DIDN'T APPROPRIATELY CONSIDER 
THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED TN SENTENCING 
Where a Defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed and excessively harsh 
sentence, the Appellate Court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the 
public interest. See State v. Reinke, l 03 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982 ). 1n order to show an 
abuse of discretion in the District Court's sentencing decision, the Defendant needs to show that, 
in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. 
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,294 (1997). 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and ( 4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. The protection of society is the primary objective the 
Court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497,500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence 
which protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. 
State v. Toohill, I 03 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of society is 
influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing. 
Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; LC. § 19-2521. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held 
that rehabilitation "should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal 
sanction." State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in 
State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015). 
The District Court's focus was not on either the primary goal or the initial consideration 
5 
of sentencing. Rather, it stated, "the primary focus of this sentence was punishment for the bad 
behavior that occurred here." (Tr., p.51, Ls.3-5.) While that is a valid consideration, it should 
not be a primary focus of the sentence, particularly given all the mitigating factors present in this 
case. For instance, Mr. Goodrich, who was fifty-six years old at the time of the sentencing (PSI, 
p.182), had significant periods oflaw-abiding and productive behavior. (See PSI, pp.188-91.) 
He was able to do so despite witnessing a truly tragic event which ultimately resulted in him 
developing a destructive lifestyle involving drug and alcohol abuse. (See, e.g., Tr., p.33, Ls.1-
13.) 
To that point, Mr. Goodrich did express remorse, and accepted responsibility, for his 
conduct, particularly in regard to the charge of giving drugs to the victim. (PSI, p.187; Tr., p.42, 
Ls.16-23.) Acknowledgment of guilt indicates that he is taking the first steps toward 
rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,815 (Ct. App. 2010). And, as defense counsel 
explained, Mr. Goodrich has a desire to continue that process. (Tr., p.33, L.14 - p.36, L.24.) 
Furthermore, as the psychosexual evaluation revealed, Mr. Goodrich's risk to reoffend was the 
product of dynamic factors, i.e., factors that were capable of changing through rehabilitative 
efforts. (See PSI, pp.162-63) As such, it recommended treatment in a supervised scenario. (See 
PSI, p.178; cf Tr., p.21; Ls.7-12 (the prosecutor acknowledging that recommendation).) 
For these reasons, defense counsel explained a period of retained jurisdiction would best 
serve the goals of sentencing because it would provide the District Court with additional 
information on Mr. Goodrich's growing dedication to, and ability to complete, a rehabilitative 
program, and so, mor quickly return to being a productive member of society. (Tr., p.40, Ls.13-
23.) That is, after all, the purpose of allowing the District Courts to retain jurisdiction. See, e.g., 




imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the Defendant's 
rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation."). And, as defense counsel stated (Tr., p.40, 
Ls.13-23), if the District Court was not satisfied with Mr. Goodrich's performance during the 
period of rained jurisdiction, it could still relinquishjurisdiction and require Mr. Goodrich to 
serve the underlying sentence. See, e.g., State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) ( affirming 
an order revoking probation despite a recommendation from the rider staff that the Defendant be 
placed on probation). 
Furthermore, while the District Court did acknowledge some of the mitigating factors 
(See, e.g., Tr., p.4 7, Ls. l 0-20), it did not sufficiently consider their full impact in regard to all the 
sentencing factors. Rather, it considered those factors in regard to how they affected the amount 
of punishment it would order. (See, e.g., Tr. p.47, Ls.10-22 (explaining that, because Mr. 
Goodrich's demonstrated ability to overcome prior addictions and live a law-abiding lifestyle, "it 
is for that reason I'm not giving you a longer sentence than I do. I could send you to prison for 
life.").) The District Court did not, for example, sufficiently appreciate the impact of those 
factors on the potential for actually addressing Mr. Goodrich's underlying issues through a timely 
opportunity for rehabilitation. (See Tr., p.51, Ls.5-14 (the District Court simply articulating the 
hope that Mr. Goodrich can become a productive member of society at some unspecified point in 
the future).) His advancing age is also a factor. Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho 
Court of Appeals have recognized that the timing of rehabilitative programming is an important 
consideration at sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953 ), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227,228 (1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 
(1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 
639 (Ct. App. 1988). 
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An evaluation of sentencing criteria, as applied to the Defendant, is appropriate here. This 
evaluation is as follows: 
( 1) Mr. Goodrich has been employed at meaningful jobs most of his life. His early 
childhood is discussed above. I le came from this background to become a hard working, 
responsible individual. Yes, he made mistakes along the way, but has not been a significant 
danger to society throughout. He shows high likelihood that he has learned from his experiences 
and he wi II become even less of a risk to society. Retained jurisdiction and the training received 
would make rehabilitation even more likely. 
(2) Deterrence of this individual and the public in general. A retained jurisdiction or 
probation sentence would serve the deterrence goal well. It's significant punishment and the 
knowledge and discipline he would learn would be much more helpful than a standard prison 
sentence. 
(3) The possibility ofrehabilitation. The Defendant has a substantial likelihood of 
rehabilitation. He was 56 years old at the time of sentencing, was gainfully employed, and had 
many years of a normal, productive life as discussed below. 
( 4) He would be receiving a sentence in line with what others have received for their 
offences. Retaining jurisdiction would be an adequate punishment and deterrent in this situation. 
Furthermore, providing for rehabilitative opportunities actually provides better protection 
to society in the long-term because it actually addresses the issues which underlie the criminal 
conduct. This is particularly true in Mr. Goodrich's case, where his risk to reoffend is the product 
of dynamic, changeable factors. (See PSI, pp.158, 163.) Therefore, in this case a sentence which 
sufficiently considers all the goals of sentencing would take the opportunity to change those 
dynamic factors through a timely rehabilitative program. (See PSI, p. 178 (the psychosexual 
8 
evaluation recommending precisely that); cf Tr., p.21, Ls, 7-12 (the prosecutor acknowledging 
that recommendation).) Thus, the District Court's decision to focus on the goal of punishment to 
the detriment of the goals of protection of society and rehabilitation constitutes an abuse of its 
discretion. 
The case of State v. Miller, Case No. 35845 (Ct. App. 2010) contains a detailed 
discussion of the issues that are also present in this case. Miller, supra, dealt with a conviction for 
violation of the controlled substance laws. The Defendant claimed that the sentence was 
excessive. 
The Court cited State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,276; 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App. 2000) in 
stating that the standard in such cases is that the sentencing court must have abused its discretion 
for a sentence to be excessive. However, a sentence may represent such an abuse of discretion 
because it is unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Jackson, l 30 Idaho 293,294; 939 
P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997). 
The Appeals Court conducts an independent review of the record having regard for the 
nature of the offender and the protection of the puhlic interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 
772; 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982) Them are no definitive parameters to be applied by the 
Appellate Court in evaluating claims of excessiveness. 
General objectives of appellate sentence review are: 
(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the 
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of 
the public interest. 
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an 
opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence. 
9 
(iii) to promote respect for the law by correcting abuse of the sentencing power 
and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing power; and 
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing 
which are both rational and just. 
State v. Brown, 121 Idaho at 1978; 393, 825 P.2d at 490. State v. Wo{(e, 99 Idaho 
382,384; 582 P.2d 728, 730. 
Addiction does not excuse the crimes committed while a person is under the influence of 
drugs. It is, however, a factor which should be considered at sentencing. Nice, l 03 Idaho at 90; 
645 P.2d at 325. Same with mental illness. l.C. § 19-2523; State v. Stroud, 137 Idaho 457; 461, 
50 P.3d 472, 476 (2002). The court unduly discounted in its sentencing consideration, the effect 
of Mr. Goodrich's illness and long standing substance addiction. However, his sentence should 
not be longer than necessary to achieve retribution and the other sentencing goals articulated. 
See Jackson, 130 Idaho at 296; 939 P.2d at 1375. 
The independent review conducted by the Appeals Court will show the following about 
Mr. Goodrich: 
1. A middle aged gentleman; 
2. With serious health issues including a recent surgery to remove a large 
growth from his eye and hearth trouble; 
3. Someone with strong family help; 
4. A native of Idaho for many years; 
5. An individual with a good work record; 
6. Someone that knows that he did wrong and wants to be involved in such 
activities in the future; 
10 
7. Someone with a more than difficult childhood; 
8. Someone that does have something positive to add to society. 
A period of retained jurisdiction would meet these goals more favorably than the cun-ent 
sentence. The Defendant has never been accused of a violent crime. The learning and discipline 
that he would learn in the rider program would best protect the public, serve as a deten-ent in the 
future and serve as a punishment and focal point to learn respect for the law. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Goodrich respectfully requests that this Court vacate the sentencing order and remand 
case with instructions to retain jurisdiction. 









CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of February, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of 
within and foregoing document upon the attorney named below in the manner noted: 
Deputy Attorney General 
State ofidaho 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 




Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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